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Patent Eligibility of Predictive Algorithm in
Second Generation Personalized Medicine
Jerry I-H Hsiao*
I. INTRODUCTION
Medicine is now undergoing a revolution that will transform its entire
practice in every way. This revolution is the result of combining the holistic
approach to biology and digital revolution to generate and analyze Big Data.1
Once realized, we will be moving away from “One-Size-Fits-All” to person-
alized medicine by recognizing individual differences rather than relying on
a statistical average. In past decades, doctors used diagnostic tools to deter-
mine if patients carrying certain genes would cause them to be susceptible to
certain diseases.2 This one-to-one correlation is known as First Generation
Personalized Medicine. Now, by combining the power of medicine and com-
puters, doctors are able to use predictive algorithms to diagnose and make
treatment decisions using a vast array of data, which is known as Second
Generation Personalized Medicine.3
The advent of sophisticated predictive algorithms in Second Generation
Medicine needs sufficient incentives. Patents have always provided such in-
centives for industries to innovate and to disseminate new findings to the
public in exchange for a limited monopoly right.4 The patent system has
played a vital role in promoting the United States as a global innovation
powerhouse. However, whether the patent system will continue to serve its
role is now called into question by several U.S. Supreme Court cases, includ-
ing Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories5 and Alice
Corporation Pty. v. CLS Bank International.6 These two cases, working to-
gether, have the potential to deny many useful and valuable process/method
inventions at the patent eligibility stage without giving them the chance to be
assessed for patentability. To make things worse, Mayo and Alice give almost
no guidance on how one could satisfy the patent eligibility test. A murky
* Assistant Professor in Law, University of Macau; PhD in Law, University of
London. I would like to thank members of the SMU Science and Technology
Law Review for their dedication and hard work editing this article. All errors
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1. Leroy Hood & Mauricio Flores, A Personal View on Systems Medicine and the
Emergence of Proactive P4 Medicine: Predicative, Preventive, Personalized
and Participatory, 29(6) N. BIOTECHNOLOGY 612 (2013).
2. How are Genetic Conditions Diagnosed?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Mar.
19, 2019), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/consult/diagnosis.
3. Alexander L. Fogel & Joseph C. Kvedar, Artificial Intelligence Powers Digital
Medicine, DIGITAL MEDICINE 5 (2018).
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
5. 566 U.S. 66 (2012).
6. 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
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patent system is not a healthy start for industries focusing on Second Genera-
lized Personalized Medicine.
This article aims to assess patent eligibility of the predictive algorithm
used in in Second Generation Personalized Medicine under Mayo and Alice.
The article first defines the technology behind Second Generation Personal-
ized Medicine in Section II, followed by a look into the patent eligibility
jurisprudence in the United States in Section III. The article then assesses the
implications that Mayo and Alice brought to patent eligibility for the predica-
tive algorithm in Section IV and compares the U.S.’s approach to the ap-
proach adopted by the European Patent Office (EPO) in Section V. This
article then makes recommendations to these judicially-created obstacles in
Section VI.
II. REVOLUTION THAT LINKS MEDICINE AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
A. Medical Revolution: The Coming of Systems Medicine
1. Systems Medicine
Systems medicine is the child of systems biology that aims to alter
health care through: (1) a systems approach to disease; and (2) driving the
emergence of technologies that permit the exploration of new dimensions of
patient data space and the analyses of the quantized units of biological infor-
mation.7 Due to their complexity, biological systems cannot be compared to
engineered machines, where all parts are exactly known. Instead, biocom-
plexity needs to be integrative. Hence, system medicine transitioned biology
from a rather qualitative and descriptive discipline to a quantitative and ex-
planatory science.8
This approach was made possible when biology was equipped with
modern analytical technologies, such as omics sciences and a rapid develop-
ment in computer performance and storage capacity.9 The progress in com-
putational, as well as methodological, tools to produce, store and analyze the
large amount of biological (genomic, proteomic, metabolomics, or physi-
omic) data gave rise to the development of mathematical models and com-
puter simulations that are able to describe the underlying dynamics of life
processes.10
7. Systems Medicine, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Systems_medicine
(last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
8. Lars Kuepfer & Andreas Schuppert, Systems Medicine in Pharmaceutical Re-
search and Development, in SYSTEMS MEDICINE 89 (Ulf Schmits & Olaf
Wolkenhauer eds., 2016).
9. Marc Kirschner, Systems Medicine: Sketching the Landscape, in SYSTEMS
MEDICINE 5–6 (Ulf Schmits & Olaf Wolkenhauer eds., 2016).
10. Id. at 6.
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Systems medicine enables the advent of P4 medicine (predictive, pre-
ventive, personalized and participatory). In the future, everyone will have
his/her genome sequenced.11 The genomes of individuals will provide infor-
mation on the many genetic variants in the chromosome of each individual to
predict the wellness of that individual.12 Preventive means the ability to pre-
dict the potential future emergence of disease-perturbed networks and their
cognate diseases.13 Personalized means that each person must be treated as a
unique individual and not as a statistical average, because humans differ
from one another by about six million nucleotides in their genomes.14 Par-
ticipatory means that P4 medicine is very different from the passive recipient
of expert advice characteristic of pre-digital medicine and relies greatly on
the positive contributions of activated patients and consumers.15 Due to the
limited scope of this article, the main focus will be on personalized medicine.
2. From First Generation to Second Generation Personalized
Medicine
“Personalized medicine, where Big Data meets Big Health, has been
hailed as the next leap forward in health care . . .”16 Conventional evidence-
based medicine relies principally on clinical trials designed to be broadly
applicable across populations, so drugs are similarly broadly approved rather
than approved for small sub-populations.17 This approach develops strong
scientific evidence of average treatment efficacy but misses much of the vari-
ation among patients.18 Personalized medicine, on the other hand, aims to
remedy this problem by demonstrating scientific links between biological pa-
tient characteristics, diagnoses, and treatment options.19
11. See Megan Humphrey, Should Everyone Have Their Whole Genome Sequenced




13. Hood & Flores, supra note 1, at 618.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 619.
16. W. Nicholson Price II, Black Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 419, 420
(2015).
17. Rosemary Roberts et al., Pediatric Drug Labeling: Improving the Safety and
Efficacy of Pediatric Therapies, JAMA (Aug. 20, 2003), https://jamanetwork
.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/197130.
18. P. M. Rothwell, Can Overall Results of Clinical Trials Be Applied to All Pa-
tients?, 345 LANCET 1616, 1617–18 (1995).
19. Price, Black Box Medicine, supra note 16, at 426.
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Personalized medicine contrasts with much of contemporary evidence-
based medicine.20 The dominant purpose of personalized medicine is to un-
derstand the relationship between patient characteristics and interventions
which can be validated in clinical trials.21 For example, using a single gene
test to find whether a patient’s cancer is likely to respond to a drug developed
alongside that test and treating the patient accordingly is considered First
Generation Personalized Medicine.22 One prominent example of this type of
medicine was illustrated in Myriad’s case.23 Myriad had discovered the
breast cancer gene (BRCA), the gene code for proteins that play a significant
role in warding off cancer.24 Some individuals have BRCA genes with varia-
tions that attenuate the encoded protein to prevent cancer, thus rendering an
individual possessing these variations more susceptible to certain forms of
cancer.25 BRCA testing is normally carried out by a clinical laboratory and
involves amplifying portions of the patient’s DNA by methodologies such as
a polymerase chain reaction (PCR).26 The synthetic copies of the genomic
DNA molecules resulting from amplification are then analyzed for the pres-
ence of genetic variations associated with an altered susceptibility to
cancer.27
This simple correlation method fails to address the complexity of bio-
logical relationships. This is true especially when “diseases and treatments
are frequently dependent on combinations of multiple genetic variables with
environmental factors and other physical variables such as weight, blood
pressure and sex.”28 Aside from the omics data, clinical data could also in-
clude demographics, medical notes, electronic recordings from medical de-
vices, physical examinations, and clinical laboratory images.29 All of this
data combined (medical Big Data) reached 150 exabytes in the United States
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2016).
23. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
24. Id. at 576.
25. Id. at 582–83.
26. Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and Licensing Practices on
Access to Genetic Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to Cancer: Comparing
Breast and Ovarian Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12 GENETICS IN MED.
S15–16 (2010).
27. Id.
28. Price, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, supra note 22, at
1403–04.
29. Guidance for Industry: Electronic Source Data in Clinical Investigations, U.S.
DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 2013), https://
www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidances/ucm328691.pdf.
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by 2011.30 However, not enough of these data sets have been systematically
collected and stored and, therefore, valuable information has not been aggre-
gated, analyzed, or made available in a format to be readily accessed to im-
prove healthcare.31 McKinsey Global Institute estimates that the U.S. health
care system could save $300 billion annually if the industry unleashed the
full economic potential of data and analytics, which could reduce the national
health expenditure by almost eight percent.32 The advent of Second Genera-
tion Personalized Medicine could address these challenges by applying artifi-
cial intelligence, such as machine learning involving computer algorithms, to
detect patterns in data in order to automate complex tasks or make
predictions.
B. IT Revolution: The Role of Bioinformatics
1. Bioinformatics
In order to move from First Generation Personalized Medicine to Sec-
ond Generation Personalized Medicine, the role of medical Big Data cannot
be overlooked. This is because the data used to develop the relationships and
predictions in treatment recommendations will be much broader and more
complicated. It is necessary to characterize the patient at various levels and,
consequently, to collect, integrate, and analyze various types of data includ-
ing clinical data, molecular data, and information about cells, organs, and
even social networks.33 Much of this information is in its raw form and must
be analyzed, organized, and stored.34 In order to do so, new computational
approaches (bioinformatics) is becoming prominent in biomedical research.35
Nowadays, bioinformatics is defined as “advancing the scientific understand-
ing of living systems through computation” or “conceptualizing biology in
terms of molecules and applying” informatics techniques (applied mathemat-
30. Transforming Health Care Through Big Data, INST. FOR HEALTH TECH.
TRANSFORMATION 5 (2013), http://c4fd63cb482ce6861463-bc6183flc18e748a
49b87a2591la0555.r93cf2.rackcdn.com/iHT2_BigData_2013.pdf.
31. Top 10 Innovations for 2012: #8 Harnessing Big Data to Improve Healthcare,
CLEVELAND CLINIC, http://innovations.clevelandclinic.org/Summit/Top-10-
Medical-Innovations/Top-10-for-2012/8-Harnessing-Big-Data-to-Improve-
Healthcare.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
32. Don McDaniel & Dan D’Orazio, The Changing Role of Analytics for Health
Care Providers, SAGE GROWTH PARTNERS INDUSTRY REP. (Feb. 2012), https://
mk0lemogixesbnriq5w5.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CHANG
ING-ROLE-OF-ANALYTICS-FOR-HC-PROVIDERS-FEB-2012.pdf.
33. Antoine H.C. van Kampen & Perry D. Moerland, Taking Bioinformatics to
Systems Medicine, in SYSTEMS MEDICINE 18 (Ulf Schmitz & Olaf Wolenhauer
eds., 2016).
34. Elizabeth Pennisi, The Human Genome, 291 SCIENCE 1177–80 (Feb. 16, 2001).
35. Spotlight on Bioinformatics, NATURE.COM (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nature
.com/naturejobs/science/articles/10.1038/nj0478.
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ics, computer science, and statistics) to understand and organize the informa-
tion with these molecules on a large scale.36
Bioinformatics is made up of several components: (1) biological se-
quences such as DNA, RNA, and protein sequences; (2) databases in which
these sequences are organized; and (3) software and hardware designed to
create, access, organize, and analyze information contained within these se-
quences and databases.37 However, this data is meaningless without the al-
gorithm that can give it meaning. As stated earlier, diseases and treatments
are frequently dependent on combinations of multiple genetic variables with
environmental and other physical factors.38 To find these dependencies and
relationships, personalized medicine cannot rely on everything from clinical
trials. Instead, scientists can use sophisticated algorithms to analyze large
data sets of health information, seeking patterns, predictions, and
recommendations.39
2. Predictive Algorithm
Predictive algorithms are applied to find patterns in the data and then to
predict medical outcomes and recommend treatment.40 Nowadays, predictive
algorithms are the result of machine learning. Machine-learning deals with
the analysis and development of models and algorithms able to learn from
data in order to perform predictive analysis.41 Depending on whether it incor-
porates the outcomes, First Generation Machine Learning can be divided into
unsupervised,42 supervised,43 and semi-supervised.44 In the clinical setting,
supervised learning is more clinically relevant than unsupervised learning,
and unsupervised learning is often used as a part of the preprocessing step to
36. van Kampen & Moerland, supra note 33, at 20.
37. M. Scott McBride, Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Protection, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L. 1331, 1334 (2002).
38. Price, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, supra note 22, at
1403–04.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1401.
41. Angela Serra et al., Machine Learning for Bioinformatics and Neuroimaging, 8
WIRES DATA MINING & KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY (2018).
42. A machine learning system automatically finds dependencies, correlations, and
clusters in the data without requiring any significant human intervention.
Steven M. Bellovin et al., When Enough is Enough: Location Tracking, Mosaic
Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 555, 591–96 (2014).
43. A machine learning system that requires human annotation effort is suitable for
predictive modeling via building some relationship between the patient traits
(as input) and the outcome of interest (as output). Id. at 592–94.
44. Semi-supervised learning can be seen as the natural blend of both supervised
and unsupervised methods. Id. at 594–96.
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make the follow up supervised learning more efficient.45 Second Generation
Machine Learning includes deep learning and surpasses First Generation Ma-
chine Learning because it is limited in its accuracy by relying on program-
med rules.46 In contrast, deep learning algorithms allow machines to receive
data and self-develop complex functions to provide predictions.47
Predictive algorithms have already been put into practice in the diagno-
sis, prevention, and treatment of cancer.48 IBM’s Watson for Oncology best
exemplifies this case.49 Watson is the first system to fully understand ques-
tions posed in natural language and to tap into the entire body of medical
knowledge and the personal records of a patient to develop a diagnosis or
treatment plan in less than three seconds.50 Watson also supplements the sur-
faced treatment options with relevant evidence from the literature by leverag-
ing natural language processing and advanced machine learning algorithms
to search a corpus of over 300 medical journals, 250 textbooks, and 15 mil-
lion pages of text.51 In Japan, Watson saved a sixty-year-old woman by iden-
tifying her rare form of leukemia and took just about ten minutes to compare
the patient’s genetic changes with a database of twenty million cancer re-
search papers.52 However, Watson has not reached the stage of deep learning,
because the information on how patients with specific characteristics should
be treated is determined by human overseers.53 Watson is also not fault-
proof, as recent studies show it making wrong and unsafe treatment recom-
45. Fei Jiang et al., Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare: Past, Present and Future,
2 STROKE & VASCULAR NEUROLOGY 230, 234 (2017).
46. Fogel & Kvedar, supra note 3, at 1.
47. Id.
48. See Ricvan Dana Nindrea et al., Diagnostic Accuracy of Different Machine
Learning Algorithms for Breast Cancer Risk Calculation: A Meta-Analysis, 19
ASIAN PAC. J. CANCER PREVENTION 1747 (2018).
49. IBM Watson for Oncology, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/us-en/marketplace/
ibm-watson-for-oncology/details (last visited Aug. 26, 2019).
50. Jessica S. Allain, From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The Medical Liability Implica-
tions of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. L. REV.
1049, 1050–51 (2013).
51. IBM Watson for Oncology, supra note 49.
52. Jon Fingas, IBM’s Watson AI Saved a Woman from Leukemia, ENGADGET
(Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/08/07/ibms-watson-ai-saved-
a-woman-from-leukemia/.
53. Casey Ross & Ike Swetlitz, IBM Pitched Its Watson Supercomputer as a
Revolution in Cancer Care. It’s Nowhere Close, STAT (Sept. 5, 2017), https://
www.statnews.com/2017/09/05/watson-ibm-cancer/.
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mendations in some cases.54 Despite its current downsides, Watson provides
us with an insight of what predictive algorithm is capable of achieving.
III. PATENT ELIGIBILITY INQUIRY FOR ALGORITHM
A. Algorithm Demystified
1. What is an Algorithm?
In order to assess the patent eligibility for predictive algorithms, it is
instructive to understand what an algorithm is. In general, an algorithm is a
set of instructions for solving a problem.55 For some, an algorithm is an ab-
stract idea because it is a series of instructions, written in a high-level form of
expression, that can be carried out by a generic machine. It is a law of nature,
a mathematical idea, or an idea, and, until the specific device is specified, an
algorithm cannot be constructed.56 However, it is important to note that an
algorithm can be expressed in different ways, using divergent expressions at
different levels of sophistication and abstraction.57 An algorithm is not neces-
sarily dependent on computers58 or devised to solve problems of a mathemat-
ical nature.59 In fact, every computer program is an algorithm because for
computers to perform any useful task they need to be told what to do.60 These
instructions make up the algorithm called the program, and this uses a num-
ber of algorithms to produce a certain result.61 The function of the program is
its purpose, as distinguished from how it accomplishes that purpose (the al-
gorithm) or what is produced (the output).62
54. Meg Bryant, STAT: IBM’s Watson Gave ‘Unsafe and Incorrect’ Cancer Treat-
ment Advice, HEALTHCARE DIVE (July 26, 2018), https://www.healthcaredive
.com/news/stat-ibms-watson-gave-unsafe-and-incorrect-cancer-treatment-ad
vice/528666/.
55. Allen C. Zoracki, When is an Algorithm Invented? The Need for A New Para-
digm for Evaluating an Algorithm for Intellectual Property Protection, 15 L.J.
SCI & TECH. 579, 581 (2005).
56. Mitchell P. Novick & Helene Wallenstein, Algorithm and Software Patentabil-
ity, 7 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 313, 335 (1980).
57. John Swinson, Copyright or Patent or Both: An Algorithmic Approach to Com-
puter Software Protection, 5 HARVARD J.L. & TECH. 145, 145 (1991).
58. Id. at 146–47.
59. Niklaus Wirth, Data Structures and Algorithms, 251 SCI. AM. 60, 65 (Sept.
1984).
60. Swinson, supra note 57, at 147.
61. Id. at 147–48.
62. Id. at 149.
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An algorithm, therefore, is not a natural phenomenon or abstract con-
cept, because one cannot conceive an algorithm in nature.63 An algorithm
does not describe a natural phenomenon.64 In fact, it does not describe any-
thing other than a series of operations to be performed by a machine or
human being. Hence, algorithms are highly specific rather than abstract.65
The Federal Circuit also shared this view: “. . . a mathematical algorithm
does not appear in nature at all, but only in human numerical processes. . . . It
is difficult to determine how or why mathematical algorithms are ‘like’ laws
of nature.”66 In summary, Swinson has explained that an algorithm can be
understood as having the following features: (1) having a set of instructions
that are followed by a processor to carry out a process, which need not have
anything to do with mathematics; (2) not dependent on having a digital com-
puter as the processor; (3) every computer program is the expression of at
least one algorithm; and (4) can be used to solve many problems, not just
mathematical problems.67
B. Algorithm Patent Eligibility: The View from the U.S. Supreme
Court
1. In the 20th Century
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (Section 101), patents can be granted for ma-
chines, manufactures, processes or compositions of matter.68 An invention
has to fall into one of these four categories in order to be patent eligible.69
Although the patent eligible category is rather broad under Section 101, the
Supreme Court has created three judicial exceptions which are not patenta-
ble:70 “laws of nature, natural phenomenon and abstract ideas.”71 In the 20th
63. Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 UNIV. PITT. L. REV.
959, 980 (1986).
64. Id. at 980–81.
65. Id. at 981.
66. Arrhythmia Research Tech. v. Corazonix Corp. 958 F.2d 1053, 1066 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
67. Swinson, supra note 57, at 150.
68. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
69. Id.
70. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 569 U.S. 576, 579 (2013)).
71. Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156, 175 (1852) (Abstract ideas have been defined
as “[a] principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either them an exclu-
sive right.”).
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Century, the Supreme Court was doubtful with the patent eligibility of an
algorithm in the beginning but gradually accepted it under different tests.72
First, under Gottschalk v. Benson, pure algorithms are unpatentable as
abstract ideas.73 Prior to Benson, there was no patent law definition for an
algorithm, which the court has defined as “a procedure for solving a given
type of mathematical problem.”74 Second, in Parker v. Flook, the Court
found that simply limiting an abstract idea to a particular application or ad-
ding post-solution activity is insufficient to overcome the threshold of patent-
able subject matter.75 In order to be patent eligible, the algorithm needs to
present an “inventive concept.”76 Lastly, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme
Court held that a computer program is not automatically an “abstract idea” or
“algorithm” that precluded patent protection.77 Considering the patent claims
as a whole, the Court held that, although the method only provided applica-
tion of laws of nature and mathematical formulas, a known process is patent
eligible when the method provides a sufficient way to transform a particular
article into a different state or thing.78 The holding in Diehr solidified
Flook’s Machine-or-Transformation test, which states that a method is pat-
entable only if: (1) the method is tied to a particular machine; or (2) the
method transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.79
2. In the 21st Century
In the 21st Century, just when Diehr was decided, another three cases
called the assumption that algorithms could be patent eligible into question.
The first case was Bilski v. Happos, which involved a method for predicting
the risk of a commodity trade in the energy market using shadow transac-
tions.80 The Supreme Court held that the Machine-or-Transformation test is
not dispositive in determining eligibility of process under Section 101; it is
only a “useful and important clue.”81
72. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585, 590–91 (1978).
73. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 64, 71–4 (1972).
74. Chisum, supra note 63, at 974.
75. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590, 594.
76. Id. at 594 (“Even though a phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula
may be well known, an inventive application of the principle may be patented.
Conversely, the discovery of such a phenomenon cannot support a patent un-
less there is some other inventive concept in its application”).
77. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184–89 (1981).
78. Id. at 191–92.
79. Id.
80. Bilski v. Happos, 561 U.S. 593, 599 (2010).
81. Id. at 603.
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The second case, Mayo v. Prometheus, extended this prohibition to
medical diagnostic algorithms, which the court considered as laws of na-
ture.82 The claim concerned a typical First Generation Personalized Medicine
process involving three steps in the administering doses of the thiopurine
drugs based on one-to-one correlation measuring dosage level according to a
known biomarker.83 The claim tells the doctors to: (1) measure the current
level of the relevant metabolite; (2) use particular laws of nature to calculate
the current toxicity/inefficacy limits; and (3) reconsider the drug dosage in
light of the law. The Mayo Court considered the steps simply as instructions
that add nothing specific to the laws of nature (dosage/metabolite correlation)
other than routine, conventional activity.84 The significant part of Mayo was
the establishment of a two-step test for assessing patent eligibility.85 First,
determine if the invention is directed to one of the judicial categories of ineli-
gible subject matter.86 If so, second, ask whether the patent claims add
enough to their statement of the correlations of laws of nature to allow the
processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible process that apply natu-
ral laws.87
Recently, in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank International, the Supreme
Court reaffirmed Mayo’s two part test and applied it to claims directed to a
computerized process to mitigate settlement risk.88 The claims in Alice dealt
exclusively with utilizing the method, a computer system to carry out the
method, and software for performing the method.89 In Alice, the patent claims
involve: (1) the foregoing method for exchanging obligations (the method
claim); (2) a computer system configured to carry out the method for ex-
changing obligations (the systems claim); and (3) a computer readable me-
dium containing program code for performing the method of exchanging
obligations (the media claim), all of which required the use of computer.90
The Supreme Court asserted that certain claims involving computer software
constituted ineligible subject matter under Section 101 of the Patent Act.91
Using step one of the Mayo test, the Court found that Alice’s intermediated
settlement is an abstract idea, and by merely requiring a generic computer to
82. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 91–92 (2012).
83. Id. at 82.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 77.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014).
89. Id. at 214.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 212.
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implement, it failed to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible in-
vention under step two of the Mayo test.92
IV. PATENT ELIGIBILITY FOR PREDICTIVE ALGORITHM
POST MAYO AND ALICE
A. The Death of Method Patents?
Following Alice, Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom addressed another
typical First Generation Personalized Medicine process invention, and the
Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidation of the patent using the Mayo-Alice
test.93 The patent in question was directed to certain methods of using cell-
free fetal DNA (cffDNA). The inventors discovered cffDNA in maternal
plasma and serum, the portion of maternal blood samples that other research-
ers had previously discarded as medical waste.94 By applying a combination
of known laboratory techniques to their discovery, the inventors imple-
mented a method for detecting the small fraction of paternally inherited
cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum to determine fetal characteristics, such
as gender.95
The invention, commercialized by Sequenom as its MaterniT21 test,
created an alternative for prenatal diagnosis of fetal DNA that avoids the
risks of widely-used techniques that took samples from the fetus or pla-
centa.96 The patent did not claim ccfDNA itself, but rather the method of
using it. The steps include: (1) extracting DNA from the serum or plasma
samples; (2) amplifying by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) or another
method; (3) detecting, in which the lab technician adds the amplified cffDNA
to an agarose gel containing ethidium bromide to stain and visualize the pa-
ternally inherited cffDNA; and (4) diagnosing certain fetal characteristics
based on the detection of paternally inherited cffDNA.97
By using the Mayo-Alice test, the Federal Circuit found that the patent
was directed to a multistep method, starting with cffDNA taken from a sam-
ple of maternal plasma or serum—a naturally occurring non-cellular fetal
DNA that circulates freely in the blood stream of a pregnant woman.98 The
inventors have not created or altered any of the genetic information encoded
in the cffDNA, and it is undisputed that the location of the nucleic acids
existed in nature before the inventors found them.99 The court held that the
92. Id.
93. Ariosa Diagnostics v. Sequenom, 788 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
94. Id. at 1376.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1381.
97. Id. at 1373–74.
98. Id. at 1376.
99. Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1376.
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method therefore begins and ends with a natural phenomenon, so the claims
are directed to a matter that is naturally occurring, hence falling in the Step 1
of the Mayo-Alice test.100
Under Step 2 of the Mayo-Alice test, the Federal Circuit found that all
the steps are general instructions for doctors to apply routine, conventional
techniques when seeking to detect cffDNA.101 Because method steps were
well-understood, conventional, and routine, the method of detecting pater-
nally inherited cffDNA is not new and useful.102 The only new and useful
subject matter as of the date of the application was the discovery of the pres-
ence of cffDNA in maternal plasma or serum, hence Seprenom also failed
Step 2 of the test.103 By rejecting the patent eligibility of this invention, some
commentators fear that Alice is a prelude to the death of method patents104 or
the rejection of all software patents.105
B. Implication of Mayo-Alice on Predictive Algorithm
Will the Mayo-Alice test hinder the development of Second Generation
Personalized Medicine, especially predictive algorithms? Using IBM’s Wat-
son as an example, a hypothetical patent application could include the fol-
lowing claims: (1) a Collecting step: collect the medical Big Data of the
patient (such as -omics data, electronic medical record, family history, notes
from previous office visits and test result); (2) an Application step: use pre-
dictive algorithm to find the pattern and correlation in data, analysis the data;
summaries and highlights futures of particular significance; (3) an Additional
step: the algorithm lists several additional options for physician to input (e.g.
comorbidities and disease status); and (4) a Resulting step: provide physi-
cians with diagnosis or treatment recommendations for specific patients sup-
ported with evidence. Lastly, the physician could take recommendations into
consideration when choosing to adopt or reject it. The major difference be-
tween First Generation Personalized Medicine and Second Generation
Medicine is in stage two, where sophisticated predictive algorithms are able
to find correlation, patterns between medical Big Data and the patient, and
this process could be incomprehensible or incapable by humans alone.106
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1377.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1377.
104. Timothy J. Busse, The Relativity of an Abstract Idea: A Practicable Approach
to Alice’s Inventive Concept, HOUST. BUS. & TAX L.J. 252, 255 (2016).
105. Gene Quinn, SCOTUS Rules Alice Software Claims Patent Ineligible,
IPWATCHDOG (June 19, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/06/19/scotus-
rules-alice-software-claims-patent-ineigible.
106. See Ross & Swetlitz, supra note 53 (Doctors in South Korea pointed out an
issue regarding Watson that it provides recommendations and supporting evi-
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Unlike First Generation Personalized Medicine, with clear and well un-
derstood correlations, the algorithm could result in correlations that are un-
discovered. In addition, the process on how the algorithm reached its
conclusion could often be opaque or unexplainable.107 Despite the complex-
ity, will the court still find the result merely an undiscovered law of nature as
in step 1 of the Mayo-Alice test? If so, the second step of the Mayo-Alice test
asks the court to examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it
contains an “inventive concept” sufficient to “transform” the claimed abstract
idea into a patent eligible application.108 A claim that is directed to an ab-
stract idea must have “additional features” to prevent the monopolization of
patent ineligible subject matter.109 Some of the features in predictive algo-
rithms fall right within the limitations specifically pointed out by the Su-
preme Court. For example, the claim must do more than instruct one to apply
the applicable laws.110 Also, a computer implementation does not supply the
necessary inventive concept.111 Finally, merging it together and applying it
using a computer results in the same deficient outcome.112
Post Mayo and Alice, one might infer that claims directed to software-
related inventions are now required to show a technical improvement or an
improvement to the functioning of the computer running the software.113 The
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has also issued a mem-
orandum providing examples of what constitutes “significantly more” im-
provement, such as improvements to another technology or technical field,
improvements to the functioning of the computer itself, and meaningful limi-
tations beyond generally linking the use of an abstract idea to a particular
technological environment.114 Commentators have argued that after Mayo
and Alice, patenting pure algorithms requires significantly more than just the
dences but does not really tell the physician how it came up with the particular
treatment recommendation for particular patient).
107. See, e.g., Turgay Ayer et al., Breast Cancer Risk Estimation with Artificial
Neural Networks Revisited: Discrimination and Calibration, 116 CANCER
3310, 3318 (2010).
108. Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 221 (2014).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 222.
112. See id. (“simply implementing a mathematical principle of a physical machine,
namely a computer, is not a patentable application of that principle”).
113. Natalya Dvorson & Mark C. Davis, Through the Looking Glass: Exploring the
Wonderland of Patent Subject Matter Eligibility after Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank
International, 7 LANDSLIDE 8, 10 (2014).
114. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION INSTRUC-
TIONS IN VIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN Alice Corporation Pty.
LTD. V. CLS BANK INTERNATIONAL, ET AL. (June 25, 2014), https://www.uspto
.gov/sites/default/files/patents/announce/alice_pec_25jun2014.pdf.
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algorithm itself, which will either be held a product of nature or an abstract
idea.115 Some commentators suggest the easiest way to overcome this patent-
ing obstacle is to add “something more,” such as diagnostics.116 This leads
innovators to turn away from developing complex algorithms and instead
focus on a simpler, more explicit relationship that can be tied to a physical
product or process.117
C. Mayo and Alice: Underlying Confusion
Looking closely at Mayo and Alice, one comes across several keywords
such as “purely conventional,” “inventive concept,” and “significantly more”
that the Supreme Court used to reject patent eligibility.118 These terms, how-
ever, are very similar to the terms used in judging obviousness in Section
103.119 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has been emphasizing the danger of
“pre-emption” that patents will not be granted to preempt the basic building
blocks of human ingenuity.120 By stressing on the inventor’s actual contribu-
tion to the field, the Supreme Court is looking into the breadth of claims
under the realm of Section 112, using written description and enablement.121
Mayo and Alice hence create: (1) confusing policies underlying patent eligi-
115. Price, Black Box Medicine, supra note 16, at 445.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 566 U.S. 66, 79 (2012);
see also Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 215–17 (2014).
119. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (“A patent for a claimed invention may not be ob-
tained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed
as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been
obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patent-
ability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made”).
120. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 216–17 (“We have described the concern that drives this
exclusionary principle as one of preemption. . . . Those that integrates the
building blocks into something more . . . pose no comparable risk of pre-emp-
tion, and therefore remain eligible of the monopoly granted under our patent
laws”).
121. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person
skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same. . . . The specification shall
conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the inventor . . . regards as the invention”).
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bility as compared to other patent law doctrines; and (2) a confusing test
governing patent eligibility.122
By using patent eligibility to assess obviousness of an invention, the
court has caused confusion in applying Sections 101 and 103.123 Because the
components of a claim may not be assessed individually under Section 103,
claims are analyzed individually and as a whole when determining if the
additional elements of a patent transform the abstract idea into a patent eligi-
ble mater under Section 101.124 By allowing a claimed invention to be dis-
sected into its individual components, the Supreme Court is allowing Section
101 to do what is not an option under Section 103: looking at the individual
claims of an invention for obviousness.125 Justice Stewart warns against the
majority’s use of “inventive application” in his dissent in Flook.126
Further, questions include the difference between the inventive concept
required in Sections 101 and 103: while obviousness is judged from the view
of a person having ordinary skill in the art, would this person also be used to
judge inventive concept in Section 101? This ambiguous and heightened bar
for patent eligibility has led lower courts to refuse patents.127 Rejecting pre-
dictive algorithm claims during the subject matter inquiry and looking into
the claims separately at the subject matter eligibility stage saves the court the
peril of hindsight bias when assessing obviousness. However, by fusing the
subject eligibility and obviousness requirement, the U.S. approach might re-
ject many potentially patentable inventions prematurely.
V. PREDICTIVE ALGORITHM PATENT ELIGIBILITY
UNDER THE EPO APPROACH
Some commentators, however, have found that the Supreme Court’s
confusing test might be reasonable because, surprisingly, the Supreme
Court’s construction of patentable subject matter seems to reach a similar
122. David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 186
(2016).
123. Paxton M. Lewis, The Conflation of Patent Eligibility and Obviousness: Al-
ice’s Substitutions of Section 103, UTAH L. REV. ON LAW 13, 28 (2017).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 30.
126. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 600 (1978) (“It strikes what seems to me an
equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by importing into its
inquiry under 35 U.S.C. section 101 the criteria of novelty and inventiveness.
Section 101 is concerned only with subject matter patentability. Whether a pat-
ent will actually issue depends upon the criteria of section 102 and section
103”).
127. Taylor, supra note 122, at 237.
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result as the European Patent Office (EPO).128 By applying the “inventive
concept” test during the second step of Section 101’s subject matter determi-
nation, not only could the Supreme Court avoid the hindsight bias prohibition
under Section 103, but it could also provide a similar standard on the subject
matter jurisprudence on both sides of the Atlantic.129
Could it be possible that the Supreme Court is aiming for a higher pur-
pose, the global harmonization of patent law, rather than creating a bright
line rule for patentable subject matter inquiry? Even if this is the case, should
the Supreme Court take this matter in hand or should the Court leave it for
Congress to decide? The more important question is: has the Mayo-Alice test
actually reached the result similar to the European approach?
A. What Constitutes Patent Eligible Subject Matter?
In Europe, Article 52 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) states
that patents shall be granted for any inventions in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step, and are susceptible of
industrial application.130 Specifically, EPC Article 52(2) (a–d) suggests that:
(1) Discoveries; (2) Scientific theories; (3) Mathematical methods; (4) Aes-
thetic creations; (5) Schemes; (6) Rules and methods for performing mental
acts; (7) Playing games or doing business; (8) Programs for computers; and
(9) Presentations of information might not be considered as invention under
EPC 52(1), but they are only prohibited “as such.”131 By providing evidence
of some technical effects, they will be patent eligible.132
Unlike the United States, where an invention has to fall under one of the
Section 101 categories, EPO requires the invention be of “technical charac-
ter” to the extent that it must relate to a technical field,133 must be concerned
with a technical problem,134 and must have technical features in terms of the
matter for which protection is sought and can be defined in the claim.135 In
regard to software related inventions, whether algorithms are patent eligible
was also an issue for EPO.136 Throughout the years, EPO’s Technical Boards
128. Dan L. Burk, The Inventive Concept in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 46 INT’L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 865 (2014).
129. Id. at 867.
130. Eur. Pat. Convention Article 52(1) (2016) [hereinafter EPC].
131. EPC Article 52(2).
132. See, e.g., Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, Part G – Chapter II-2 (2017);
see also e.g., Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T0258/03, Apr. 21, 2004 (“Activi-
ties falling within the notion of a non-invention ‘as such’ would typically re-
present purely abstract concepts devoid of any technical implications.”).
133. EPC Rule 42(1)(a).
134. EPC Rule 43(1).
135. Id.
136. See Guidelines for Examination in the EPO, Part G – Chapter II-3.6 (2017).
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of Appeal (TBA) has deployed different tests through various cases. For ex-
ample, in T208/84,137 “technical contribution approach”138 was introduced. In
T1173/97,139 TBA adopted the “technical effect approach”140 which, for the
first time, allows the patent eligibility of computer program. Finally, in T258/
03,141 the EPO settled on the “any apparatus” approach.142 Under this ap-
proach, as long as the claims of a patent recite some apparatus, the claim will
meet the Article 52 requirement.143 In light of the case law of the TBA, an
invention is to be construed as “subject matter having technical matter.”
B. T258/03 Hitachi and Alice
Before assessing the patent eligibility for Second Generation Personal-
ized Medicine predictive algorithms in Europe, it might be instructive to look
at a TBA decision to see the similarities and differences between the EPO
and U.S. approach. In T258/03 Hitachi, the main request for the patent in-
137. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T208/84, July 15, 1987.
138. Id. at 19 (“Decisive is what technical contribution the invention as defined in
the claim when considered as whole makes the known art”).
139. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T1173/97, July 1, 1998.
140. Id. at 620–21 (“[C]ould be found in the further technical effects deriving from
the execution (by the hardware) of the instructions given by the computer pro-
gram . . . where they cause the software to solve a technical problem, an inven-
tion which brings about such an effect may be considered an invention . . .
Consequently a patent may be granted . . . in every case where a program for a
computer is the only means, or one of the necessary means, of obtaining a
technical effect within the meaning specified above, where, for instance, a tech-
nical effect of the kind is achieved by the internal functioning of a computer
itself under the influence of said program”).
141. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T258/03.
142. Id. at 585 (“What matters having regard to the concept of invention within the
meaning of Article 52(1) EPC is the presence of technical character, which
may be implied by the physical features of an entity or the nature of an activity,
or may be conferred to non-technical activity by the use of technical means. In
particular, the Board holds that the latter cannot be considered to be non-inven-
tion ‘as such’ within the meaning of Article 52 (2) and (3) EPC. Hence, in the
Board’s view, activities falling within the notion of a non-invention “as such”
would typically represent purely abstract concepts devoid of any technical im-
plication. The Board is aware that its comparatively broad interpretation of the
term ‘invention’ in Article 52 (1) EPC will include activities which are so fa-
miliar that their technical character tends to be overlooked, such as the act of
writing using pen and paper . . . . It is therefore concluded that, in general, a
method involving technical means is an invention within the meaning of Arti-
cle 52(1) EPC”).
143. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T 2258/10, Oct. 4, 2011 (“Following T 931/95
(OJ EPO 2001, 441), see headnote III, any apparatus constituting a physical
entity or concrete product has technical character”).
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cludes: claim one, “automatic auction method executed in a server com-
puter”; claim two, a “computerized auction apparatus’s comprising a server
computer is defined,” and claim three, “a computer for carrying out an auc-
tion.” In simple terms, the claims are similar to Alice: first an abstract idea,
auction, and second, merely reciting a generic computer.144
However, unlike Alice, TBA first acknowledged earlier decisions, say-
ing that any comparison with the prior art was inappropriate because deter-
mining the technical contribution of an invention involves assessing the prior
art, which is more appropriate during examination of novelty and inventive
step.145 TBA then states that because it is difficult to separate a claim into
technical and non-technical features, finding a technical aspect should be
done when assessing inventive step.146 TBA further states that only purely
abstract concepts will be devoid of any technical implications.147 As long as
there is presence of technical character, which might be implied by the physi-
cal features of an entity or the nature of an activity, or may be conferred to
non-technical activity by the use of technical means (e.g. a computer), then
that will satisfy the concept of invention in Article 52(1).148
Although the Hatchi invention satisfied Article 52(1) of the EPC for
patent eligibility, it nonetheless failed the inventive step requirement in Arti-
cle 56 of the EPC.149 The reason is that the invention involves a feature for
when more than one bidder offers a certain “desired price,” the auction price
is increased to sort out the lower bids.150 This requires certain bid informa-
tion-”a desired price” and a “maximum price.”151 However, the feature is
fundamentally independent of the computer arrangement for performing the
auction.152 One could just conduct a Dutch auction without computer support
and instead collect bids in writing in a call for tender in order for the partici-
pants not to be present at the auction.153 Therefore, TBA reasoned that the
144. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T258/03, pp. 2–4, Apr. 21, 2004.
145. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T1173/97, p. 17, July 1, 1998.
146. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T258/03, p. 5.
147. Id. at p. 6.
148. Id.
149. EPC Article 56 (2016) (“an invention shall be considered as involving an in-
ventive step if, having regard to the state of the art, it is not obvious to a person
skilled in the art. If the state of the art also includes documents within the
meaning of Article 54, paragraph 3, these documents shall not be considered in
deciding whether there has been an inventive step”).
150. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T258/03, p. 4.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 7.
153. Id.
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invention could be regarded as a mere automation of a non-technical activity
of performing a Dutch auction.154
Unlike the U.S. approach, the EPO did not bar the patent eligibility of
the invention because, although it claims an abstract idea, a Dutch auction is
deemed to have a technical feature by reciting a computer in the claims.155
However, this invention failed to satisfy the inventive step of the patentabil-
ity test because the steps do not necessarily need a computer to accomplish
the task.156 The result might have been different, however, if a step had been
designed in such a way as to be particularly suitable for being performed on a
computer, because then it would arguably have had a technical character to
satisfy the inventive step.157
C. Similar Results between the United States and EPO?
For a Second Generation Personalized Medicine predictive algorithm to
be considered an invention in Europe, it needs to possess technical charac-
ter.158 According to T38/86, headnote III, the use of technical means that
carrying out a method for performing mental acts, partly or entirely without
human intervention, may, under Article 52(3) of the EPC, render such a
method a technical processes or method, and, therefore, an invention within
the meaning of Article 52(1) of the EPC.159 This applies even if the technical
means are commonly known. For example, the inclusion of a computer, a
computer network, a readable medium carrying a program, etc. in a claim
154. Id.
155. Id. at 6.
156. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T258/03, p. 4.
157. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T0769/92, p. 2, May 31, 1994. (“General pur-
pose management system (1994), headnote 1 (An invention comprising func-
tional features implemented by software (computer programs) is not excluded
from patentability under Article 52(2)(c) and (3) EPC if technical considera-
tions concerning particulars of the solution of the problem the invention solves
are required in order to carry out that same invention. Such technical considera-
tions lend a technical nature to the invention in that they imply a technical
problem to be solved by (implicit) technical features”).
158. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, Part G(II)(3.6)
(2017).
159. Euro. Pat. Off. Ct. Tech. App. T 0038/86, p. 2, Feb. 14, 1989.
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lends technical character to the claimed subject matter.160 Hence, the EPO
sets a low threshold for showing evidence of technical effects.161
Following the EPO’s approach, a Second Generation Personalized
Medicine predictive algorithm would be considered an invention and patent
eligible, despite the fact that it might show correlations that point toward
abstract ideas (such as the hypothetical correlation step 2 supra), because
data collection in step one will not be seen as merely routine or conventional
since prior arts are not to be compared during the patent eligibility stage.162
The reciting of computer in the claim further enhances the technicality of the
invention. The potential opacity of the collection, step two, illustrates that
this process is beyond human comprehension and particularly suitable to be-
ing performed on a computer so as to satisfy the inventive step as suggested
in T 769/92, headnote one.163
By assessing both Alice-Mayo and the EPO test on a software-related
invention, the result is diverse. Unlike what some commentators have sug-
gested, the result across the Atlantic does not have a similar standard on
subject matter inquiry.164 In the United States, the courts can view the claims
as a whole and separately to determine subject matter eligibility when look-
ing at the inventions as a whole and assessing for obviousness.165 In Europe,
the claims are viewed as a whole in assessing whether the claimed subject
matter is an invention and separately and as a whole in the assessment for the
inventive step.166 By going opposite directions, under Alice-Mayo, a predica-
160. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, G(II)(3.6) (2017)
(This section of Guidelines for Examination provides some examples regarding
technical effects on software-related inventions, such as: “A further technical
effect which lends technical character to a computer program may be found e.g.
in the control of an industrial process or in the internal functioning of the com-
puter itself or its interfaces under the influence of the program and could, for
example, affect the efficiency or security of a process, the management of com-
puter resources required or the rate of data transfer in a communication link”).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Euro. Pat. Off. Tech. Ct. App. T 0769/92, p. 2.
164. Siva Thambisetty, Alice and ‘Something More’: The Drift Towards European
Patent Jurisprudence, 3 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES 691, 694 (2016).
165. See generally Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
166. Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office, Part G (VII)(6)
(2017), (“When assessing the inventive step of such a mixed-type invention, all
those features which contribute to the technical character of the invention are
taken into account . . . . However, features which do not contribute to the
technical character of the invention cannot support the presence of an inventive
step”).
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tive algorithm might be rejected prematurely at the subject matter phase.167
On the other hand, it is relatively easy to become an invention in Europe.168
Put simply, Europe is currently more patent friendly than the United States in
the field of software-related inventions.169
VI. PATENT POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR PREDICTIVE
ALGORITHM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Mayo-Alice Failed to Foster Innovation
The role of patents, as stated in the U.S. Constitution, is to promote the
progress of arts and sciences.170 For a long time, the United States has been
heralded as the world leader in prompting technological innovation.171 How-
ever, this position is now questionable as the U.S. patent system is increas-
ingly mired in legal uncertainty.172 According to Sachs, in the three years
following the Supreme Court’s last Section 101 decision in Alice, there have
been 473 Federal Circuit and district court Section 101 decisions, 317 of
which invalidated the patents at issue in whole or in part.173 Of these 473
cases, 60% of all challenged patents were found to be invalid, while 66.4%
of all claims were invalidated.174 The Federal Circuit informs us by number
just how much impact Alice brings to inventors, with 80 of 88 patents having
been invalidated.175
This creates a serious concern because algorithms are becoming increas-
ingly important in today’s economy.176 Gartner has predicted that by 2019,
250,000 patent applications will include claims for algorithms, a tenfold in-
167. Michael Borella, The Subject Matter Eligibility of Machine Learning: An Early
Take, PATENT DOCS (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.patentdocs.org/2018/09/the-
subject-matter-eligibility-of-machine-learning-an-early-take.html.
168. Jim Ruttler, EPO v. USPTO Examination, RULLER MILLS PLLC (Apr. 24,
2016), http://ruttlermills.com/Blog/EPO-vs.%20USPTO%20Examination.
169. Dennis Crouch, Patenting Software in the US as Compared with Europe,
PATENTLYO (Sept. 29, 2014), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/09/patenting-
software-compared.html.
170. See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl.8.
171. Kevin Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligi-
bility Doctrine is Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 939 (2017).
172. Id. at 24.




176. Michael Cooney, Gartner: Algorithm-Based Technology Patents are Raging,
NETWORKWORLD (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.networkworld.com/article/31672
42/security/gartner-algorithm-based-technology-patents-are-raging.html.
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crease from five years ago.177 By labeling the next wave of economy as the
algorithm economy, which helps to power the machine-to-machine evolution
in the Internet of Things, the algorithm is where the real value lies by turning
data into actions.178 However, of the top forty organizations patenting the
most algorithms in the past five years, thirty-three are Chinese businesses
and universities, while the only western company in the top ten is IBM at
number ten.179 It is not surprising that commentators have warned that the
gold standard of the U.S. patent system is eroding while Europe and China
are catching up.180
1. Mayo-Alice: The Way Forward?
Many commentators have expressed concerns with the Court’s decision
in Alice and proposed amendments to Section 101, even proposing to abolish
Section 101 altogether.181 The American Intellectual Property Law Associa-
tion (AIPLA) has proposed legislative amendments to Section 101 relating to
patent eligibility.182 Michelle Lee, the former Director of USPTO, has also
acknowledged that changes may need to be made to Section 101.183 How-
ever, legislative amendments to Section 101 are unlikely to occur anytime
soon.184 Administratively, the USPTO has been fast to react to the Supreme
Court’s judgement.185 After the Mayo case, the USPTO responded directly to
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Susan Moore, Gartner Says Within 5 Years, Organizations Will be Valued on
their Information Portfolios, GARTNER (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.gartner
.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2017-02-08-gartner-says-within-five-years-
organizations-will-be-valued-on-their-information-portfolios.
180. Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 171, at 955.
181. Jorge Goldstein et al., Is It Time to Amend 101?, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 25,
2016), http://ipwatchdog.com/2016/09/25/time-to-amend-101/id=72825.
182. AIPLA Legislative Proposal and Report on Patent Eligible Subject Matter, AM.
INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N 4 (May 12, 2017), http://aipla.org/resources2/reports/
2017AIPLDirect/Documents/AIPLA%20Report%20on%20101%20Reform-5-
19-17-Errata.pdf.
183. Matthew Anderson, Legislative Changes to 35 U.S.C. § 101, AM. U. INTELL.
PROP. BRIEF (Dec. 7, 2016), http://www.ipbrief.net/2016/12/07/legislative-
changes-to-35-usc-%C2%A7-101/.
184. Stuart P. Meyer, Judge Mayer’s Concurrence in IV Shows the Problem with
Judicially Created Exceptions, BILSKIBLOG (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.bilski
blog.com/2016/10/judge-mayers-concurrence-in-iv-shows-the-problem-with-
judicially-created-exceptions-html/.
185. William C. Rowland, USPTO Issues New Alice Guidance, BUCHANNAN INGER-
SOLL & ROONEY PC (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.bipc.com/uspto-issues-new-
alice-guidance.
46 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXII
the ruling with new guidelines.186 Although originally thought just to cover
“natural laws exceptions,” these guidelines have been extended to include an
“abstract idea.”187 If left for the judiciary, this exception must be refined to
meet two criteria: First, the standard must uphold the constitutional basis of
the patent system; and second, the test must survive the development of all
technological areas and prevent the swallowing up any field.188
2. Abandoning Mayo-Alice Test
Step one of the Mayo-Alice test requires determining whether a claim is
directed to a judicial exception, such as an abstract idea.189 This is a rather
odd requirement, as “at some level all inventions embody, use, reflect, rest
upon, or apply law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract idea.”190 By
merely requesting lower courts to look for an abstract idea, absent further
guidance, different people will have different perspectives on whether an ab-
stract idea is present.191 In DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com, the Federal Circuit
completely withdrew from the task of identifying an abstract idea outside the
scope of controlling precedent.192 The inoperability of the Mayo-Alice test
shows a stark contrast between the United States and Europe: Europe adopts
a liberal approach on what is patent eligible and allows the patentability doc-
trines to further assess whether the invention is patent worthy.193 Section 101
now serves not just as the gate keeper for eligibility, but also patentability,
covering areas reserved for Sections 102, 103, and 112.194 Unlike Europe on
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the clarity of the standard, the United States traps itself in the categorical
quagmire, and if the issue is unfixable, abandonment might be an option.
3. Section 101—Simply an Inquiry on Man-Made or Not
It does not take a rocket scientist to fix Section 101; one can simply
look back into history for guidance. U.S. patent law, unlike the EPC, does
not expressly list what inventions are patent ineligible, no matter how metic-
ulous it is.195 The intention of lawmakers is obvious: patent law is a tool to
foster innovation, not to hinder it.196 The welcoming attitude of the patent
system is one of the reasons why the United States surpassed other countries
in the race of biotechnology by being the first to recognize man-made bacte-
ria as patent eligible.197 This liberal attitude only suffers some setback when
congress expressly bans patent eligibility on claims directed to, or encom-
passing, a human organism in Section 33(a) of the America Invents Act.198
Hence, although not everything under the sun made by man is patentable,
absent Congress’ express prohibition on other patent ineligible subject mat-
ter, shouldn’t Section 101 be given a more liberal interpretation rather than
looking at whether the claimed invention falls into one of the judicial excep-
tion, which almost all inventions certainly will?199 Anything that is the result
of human effort is eligible for patenting. This is the position of Congress, as
confirmed by the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952.200
The requirement of human effort is similar to the EPO’s approach in
requiring the invention to possess technical means, implicitly indicating that
it is not an EPC Article 52(3) patent ineligible subject matter “as such.”201
The requirement of human effort was made famous during the twilight of the
biotech era, where much of the inventions involved might have also been
subject matter ineligible because they tended to fall into the excluded subject
matter as a “Product of Nature.”202The Product of Nature doctrine was estab-
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lished as a limitation to the broad language of Section 101.203 In Funk Broth-
ers Seed Co. v. Kao Inoculant Co.,204 the Court stated that the non-inhibitive
qualities of the bacteria are the work of nature. “The qualities of the bacteria
. . . are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men.”205 “They are mani-
festation of laws of nature, free to all men are reserved exclusively to
none.”206 This statement is strikingly similar to Court’s fear of preemption in
Alice.207
However, the Supreme Court interpreted the Product of Nature doctrine
differently in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.208 The Court rejected the PTO’s ar-
gument that living organisms are not patentable and held that a living, geneti-
cally altered organism may qualify for patent protection as a new
“manufacture” or “composition of matter” under Section 101.209 The Court
then concluded that Congress intended statutory subject matter to “include
anything under the sun that is made by man,”210 and patents would not be
provided to “hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but only to “products of
human ingenuity.”211 “Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction
was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature,
whether living or not, and human-made inventions.”212
4. Summary
In order to foster promising innovation and boost the economy, a clear
and operable patent standard is urgently needed. The current Mayo-Alice test
proves to be inoperable and cumbersome, and creates more issues than it tries
to solve. For an era that is built on Big Data and algorithms, the Mayo-Alice
test has to be abandoned; otherwise, industries might turn toward trade secret
instead and further hinder the growth of algorithm economy. Some commen-
tators have argued that the Supreme Court has confused the difference be-
tween patent eligibility and patentability,213 while some defended the
Supreme Court’s position by focusing on the inventor’s contribution.214
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However, focusing on an inventor’s contribution at Section 101 basically
leaves Section 112 redundant, and the real question is not what the inventor’s
has contributed in Section 101, but, like EPO, whether it is a man-made
invention.215 Under this approach, Second Generation Personalized Medicine
predictive algorithms will not be denied before the chance to be assessed for
patentability.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the coming age of Second Generation Personalized Medicine,
the patent system should be amenable to foster the development of this nas-
cent industry. However, the Supreme Court has been counterproductive by
issuing the Mayo-Alice test, which, as shown in this article, failed to provide
the necessary incentive. The Mayo-Alice test is inoperable, expensive, and a
doctrinal disaster. The Supreme Court could remedy the mistake simply by
looking back to the purpose of Section 101, as Congress originally intended,
looking to whether the claimed invention is man-made as the threshold for
eligibility requirement before moving to patentability assessment. Following
this approach, the Supreme Court would not run into the embarrassment of a
doctrinal disaster and would allow inventors the chance to prove the value of
their invention without being simply denied at Section 101.
215. This proposal might not be workable when machine learning evolves into
“strong AI” or Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), which is when machines
achieve consciousness or display intelligence equivalent to that of human.
Under this scenario, machines could learn, program, and interact with patients
without human intervention. Till this day, artificial intelligence has not reached
to this level, but this issue remains a topic for further studies.
